Chapter 2.8 & 2.8.1 Immunity, Duty to Defend and Indemnification, Limitation on Damages

2.8.1 Qualified Immunity

The ICJ specifically provides qualified immunity to the executive director and employees of the Commission when acting in good faith and within the scope of the compact.  It provides:

          The Commission’s executive director and employees shall be immune from suit and liability, either personally or in their official capacity, for any claim for damage to or loss of property or personal injury or other civil liability caused or arising out of or relating to any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred, or that such person had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities. . .

Interstate Compact for Juveniles, art. V, § C(1) (2008). The executive director and employees do not enjoy immunity from any damage, loss, injury, or liability caused by the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct.  Id. 

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982). The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (noting that qualified immunity covers “mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law”).  Because qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis deleted).  The purpose behind the creation of the qualified immunity doctrine is a desire to ensure that “‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam). For further discussion on immunity considerations, see Section 6.1-6.8, infra.