Who Must Comply with an Interstate Compact?
Interstate compacts are binding on the signatory states, as explained in Section 1.2 below. This means that once a state legislature adopts a compact, it binds all agencies, state officials, local authorities, and citizens to the terms of that compact. Since the very first compact case, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that a compact is an enforceable agreement governing the subject matter of the compact. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 89 (1823); see also Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 30-32 (1951); Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 334 (2010) (applying contract law principles to compact interpretation).
By enacting the ICJ the member states have entered into a binding compact that governs the movement of delinquent and status offense juveniles.[1] The ICJ is not discretionary; it binds the member states, state officials (including judges, court personnel, and probation and parole authorities) and citizens to the compact requirements determining the circumstances, procedures, and supervision applicable to interstate transfers. See, e.g., In re Crockett, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (stating, “The terms of the [Revised] ICJ do not confer any special authority on a California court to require sex offender registration in California based upon the order of a Texas state juvenile court. To the contrary, it actually prohibits California authorities from applying different supervision standards on petitioner than it would on its own juvenile probationers.”); Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 111 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating, “Once New Jersey granted permission for Doe to return to Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania was required to assume supervision over Doe and to treat him as in-state offenders. The Commission has not done so and in treating Doe and other out-of-state parolees differently, it violates its own agreement failing to do precisely what it promised . . . .”). The failure to comply with the compact can have significant consequences for a non-complying state, including being enjoined from taking actions in contravention of the compact. See, e.g., Interstate Comm’n for Adult Offender Supervision v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 04-526-KSF (E.D. Ky. June 13, 2005) (order granting permanent injunction) (“[T]he defendants, their respective officers, agents, representatives, employees and successors, and all other persons in active concert and participation with them, are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from denying interstate transfers . . . .”). In short, the ICJ and its rules do not create a recommended process but rather create a binding process that must be followed in applicable cases.
[1] As used in this Bench Book, the term “status offender” and “status offense juveniles” refers to that class of juvenile who has committed an offense that if committed by an adult would not constitute a crime. They are specific offenses that apply to individuals on account of their age and their status as a minor.