Interpretation of Interstate Compacts
Because compacts are statutes and contracts, courts interpret interstate compacts in the same manner as interpreting ordinary statutes, and also by applying contract law principles.
PRACTICE NOTE:
No court has explained when to apply statutory construction principles versus contract law principles when interpreting an interstate compact.
When determining whether a state or compact agency applied the compact in a permissible manner, courts will generally apply a statutory construction approach. See, e.g., Friends of the Columbia Gorge v. Columbia River Gorge Comm’n, 213 P.3d 1164, 1170–74 (Or. 2009) As noted in Section 1.4.1 supra, for compacts with consent, courts will apply federal law, including federal decisional law unless the consent statute or compact specifically makes state statutory, regulatory, or decisional law applicable. For compacts that do not have consent, courts apply state law.
Because ICJ received congressional consent, regulatory provisions of the juvenile transfer process and processes for returning runaways, escapees, absconders, accused delinquents, and accused status offenders are enforceable under the Supremacy Clause. Petty v. Tennessee–Missouri Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278, 79 S Ct 785, 794, 3 L.Ed.2d 804 (1959) (“The construction of a compact sanctioned by Congress under Art. I, s 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution presents a federal question). Furthermore, courts can and do routinely refer to the applicable decisional law concerning the compact, as informed by the ICJ offices, ICJ Rules, and ICJ Bench Book for Judges and Other Court Personnel. See for example Jessica J. v. State of Alaska, 442 P. 3 771 (AK S. Ct. 2019).), footnote #39; also, In re O.M., 565 A.2d 573, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (provisions in compact requiring rendition of a juvenile to another state is required by the terms of the compact which the courts and executive agencies of the District of Columbia must enforce); see also Colbert v. U.S. 601 A.2nd 603 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
When interpreting a compact to determine whether a party state has breached the compact, courts typically apply principles governing interpretation of contracts. Where there is an ambiguity, courts apply contract interpretation principles such as negotiating history, Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 235 n.5 (1991); course of performance, Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 346 (2010); and usage of trade, id. at 341–42 (considering compacts that received contemporaneous consent); Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U.S. 614, 633 (2013) (considering compacts of the same subject matter, but not receiving consent contemporaneously). In applying contract law principles, courts recognize that a compact represents a political compromise between “constituent elements of the Union,” as opposed to a commercial transaction. Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 358 F.3d 528, 542 (8th Cir. 2004). For example, the Eighth Circuit stated in one case:
While a common law contract directly affects only the rights and obligations of the individual parties to it, an interstate compact may directly impact the population, the economy, and the physical environment in the whole of the compact area. A suit alleging that a state has breached an obligation owed to its sister states under a congressionally approved interstate compact also raises delicate questions bearing upon the relationship among separate sovereign polities with respect to matters of both regional and national import.
Id. at 541–42. Consequently, the right to sue for breach of the compact differs from a right to sue for breach of a commercial contract; it arises from the compact, not state common law.
Courts generally strive to interpret and apply a compact uniformly throughout the states where the compact is effective. See, e.g., In re C.B., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 294, 295 (2010) (“One of the key elements of any interstate compact is uniformity in interpretation.”). To achieve a uniform interpretation, courts commonly look to other courts decisions; see Jessica J. v. State of Alaska supra. (“As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded in In the Interest of C.P., 533 A.2d 1001 (Pa. S.Ct. (1987) the “salient goal” of the ICJ is “to promote interests in reciprocity and cooperation among the participating states. That goal, which Alaska's legislature has adopted by implementing the ICJ, cannot be accomplished unless “each participating state recogniz[es] that sister sovereign states display no less jurisprudential excellence in dealing with issues involving the interests of runaway children.”)Id. at pp. 777-778.
PRACTICE NOTE:
Courts help ensure a uniform interpretation of compacts by citing interstate commissions’ statements about and interpretations of their compacts. Interstate commissions prepare these statements and interpretations to avoid disputes and to help the states implement the compact uniformly. For example, the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS) issues advisory opinions and produces a Bench Book similar to this book. Courts commonly cite to ICAOS advisory opinions and the ICAOS Bench Book. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Brown, 140 A.3d 768, 776-777 n.5 (R.I. 2016). Article XIII, § B.3 of the Revised ICJ also authorizes the Interstate Commission for Juveniles to issue advisory opinions. This ICJ Bench Book discusses the ICJ’s resources, including advisory opinions, throughout Chapters 2 through 6. All resources are available www.juvenilecompact.org. Courts are increasingly relying upon these interpretations to interpret the ICJ as well. See Jessica J. v. State of Alaska, 442 P. 3 771 (AK S. Ct. 2019).); Also Matter of Aubree, 79 NYS 3d 478 (Fam. Ct. NY, 2018) In re Boynton, 840 N.W.2d 762, (MI Ct. App. 2013).