ICJ as an Alternative to Extradition/UCEA
Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Extradition Clause or Interstate Rendition Clause, sets forth the general provisions applicable to the interstate movement of individuals charged with crimes and subjects them to extradition upon demand of the executive authority of the state in which the crime is committed. Historically, procedures for implementing the Extradition Clause have been governed by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA).
While special criminal procedures may be required for juveniles in other contexts, these do not apply to the movement of juveniles from one state to another. Although some form of extradition proceeding is considered necessary for juvenile criminal fugitives, no formal extradition is necessary to return a minor to a guardian. The power of the state to try a juvenile is not affected by the manner of his return to a state.
As discussed in Section 1.4 through 1.4.2 supra., the ICJ was created with congressional consent, thereby creating a statutory alternative to traditional extradition. In addition, courts have clearly recognized the ICJ is a useful alternative to extradition that permits the lawful movement of a juvenile across state lines, regardless of whether extradition could be applied. See In re Lydell J., 583 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1010 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (“The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law do not apply to Article 3 proceedings unless the applicability is specifically prescribed. [FCA § 303.1]. Thus, the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act contained in Article 570 of the CPL does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings as its applicability has not been specifically prescribed. However, the Interstate Compact for Juveniles contained in the Unconsolidated Laws § 1801 (L.1955, ch. 155, § 1, as amended) is applicable and provides the procedure by which a juvenile confined in another state may be returned to the requesting state.”). See also In re Teague, 371 S.E.2d 510, 514 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (“North Carolina Interstate Compact for Juveniles which applies uniformly and exclusively to juveniles and does not allow court to make best interest determinations for any juveniles, does not violate equal protection, even though it allows no inquiry into juvenile's best interest and does not treat juveniles the same as adults under the Compact”). U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; G.S. § 7A-689”); see also Interest of Storm, 223 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa 1974); In re C.P., 533 A.2d 1001, 1003 (Pa. 1987).
Though both the ICJ and ICAOS have received congressional consent and serve as statutory alternatives to extradition, concerns are sometimes raised regarding standard procedures for returning fugitives pursuant to the UCEA. Under the UCEA, a fugitive may waive all procedural rights incidental to the extradition. For example, upon the issuance of a Governor’s warrant, the fugitive may waive extradition rights and consent to return to the state demanding the fugitive. To be valid, the waiver must be in writing, in the presence of a judge, after the judge has informed the fugitive of his rights under the statute. Nothing in the UCEA prevents a person from voluntarily returning to a state. For juveniles, such voluntary returns are governed by ICJ Rule 6-102.
While there are no published cases regarding the return of juveniles pursuant to the ICJ rather than UCEA, several courts have recognized that an interstate compact governing supervision of out-of-state offenders provides an alternative procedure by which a person can be returned to the demanding state without complying with the formalities of the UCEA. E.g., In re Klock, 184 Cal. Rptr. 234, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Bynul, 524 N.Y.S.2d 321, 328-29 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1987); see Todd v. Fla. Parole and Prob. Comm’n, 410 So.2d 584, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“[W]hen a person is paroled to another state pursuant to an interstate compact, all requirements to obtain extradition are waived.”) An interstate compact has been held to displace the UCEA as to certain offenders and requires only minimal formalities as to the return of those offenders. Id. See also In re O.M., 565 A.2d 573, 582-583 (D.C. 1989) which held that the ICJ was adopted by the states precisely because the Extradition Clause of the Constitution did not operate with respect to juveniles.” Furthermore, the offender’s agreement to waive extradition as a condition of relocating waives the need for formal extradition proceedings upon demand by the sending state that an offender be returned. Cf. Wymore v. Green, 245 Fed. Appx. 780, 782-83 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiff’s waiver of extradition renders any formal request or permission from the requesting and sending state governors unnecessary); see also People v. Gordon, 672 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1998).
PRACTICE NOTE:
The purpose of the ICJ is to benefit juveniles by permitting them to reside and be supervised in a state where the juvenile has familial and community ties. In consideration of this privilege, a juvenile is bound by the terms of the ICJ, including ICJ Rules 4-102(2), 4-103(2), and 5-103(3) regarding waiver of extradition in certain circumstances. Therefore, a juvenile subject to the ICJ is subject to the “alternative procedures” provided in the Compact and its rules, not the provisions of the UCEA, unless a warrant is issued by an adult court pursuant to Rule 7-104.