Chapter Detention/Bail Pending Return

Detention/Bail Pending Return

A juvenile offender subject to a warrant issued under ICJ jurisdiction has no right to bail.  ICJ Rule 7-104(1) specifically prohibits any court or paroling authority in any holding state to admit a juvenile in custodial detention to bail.  Given that the Revised ICJ mandates that the rules of the commission must be afforded standing as statutory law in every member state, the “not eligible for bond” provision of ICJ Rule 7-104(1) has the same standing as if the rule was a statutory law promulgated by that state’s legislature.  See Revised Interstate Compact for Juveniles, art. IV (2008). 

The “not eligible for bond” provision in ICJ Rule 7-104(1) is not novel; states have previously recognized that under the predecessor to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, officials in a receiving state were bound by no bail determinations made by officials in a sending state.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Coniglio, 610 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (probationer transferred from Pennsylvania and could not be released on personal recognizance as Ohio authorities were bound under the ICPP by Pennsylvania decision as to consideration of probationer for release).  States have recognized the propriety of the “no bail” requirements associated with ICPP, even where there was no expressed prohibition.  In State v. Hill,  the state supreme court held that Iowa authorities were agents of Nevada, the sending state, and that they could hold the parolee in their custody pending his return to Nevada. 334 N.W.2d 746 (Iowa 1981). The trial court’s decision to admit the offender to bail notwithstanding a prohibition against such action was reversed.  In Ex parte Womack, the court found no error in denying bail to an offender subject to retaking as the Compact made no provision for bail. 455 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) And in Ogden v. Klundt, the court held that:

"Absent express statutory authorization, the courts of Washington are without power to release on bail or bond a parolee arrested and held in custody for violating his parole. The Uniform Act for Out-of-State Supervision provides that a parole violator shall be held, and makes no provision for bail or bond. The person on parole remains in constructive custody until his sentence expires. Restated, his liberty is an extension of his confinement under final judgment and sentence. Whether the convicted person is in actual custody within the prison walls or in constructive custody within the prison of his parole, the rule is unchanging; there is simply no right to release on bail or bond from prison.  See also, Aguilera v. California Department of Corrections, 247 Cal.App.2d 150 (1966); People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos, 368 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. 1977); People ex rel. Calloway v. Skinner, 300 N.E.2d 716 (N.Y. 1973); Hardy v. Warden of Queens House of Detention for Men, 288 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. 1968); January v. Porter, 453 P.2d 876 (Wash. 1969); Gaertner v. State, 150 N.W.2d 370 (Wis. 1967)." 

550 P.2d 36, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976). However, an offender cannot be held indefinitely.  See Windsor v. Turner, 428 P.2d 740 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967) (offender on parole from New Mexico who committed new offenses in Oklahoma could not be held indefinitely under the compact and was therefore entitled to writ of habeas corpus when the trial in Oklahoma would not take place for a year and New Mexico authorities failed to issue a warrant for his return).  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 488 (1972) (“The revocation hearing must be tendered within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody. A lapse of two months, as respondents suggest occurs in some cases, would not appear to be unreasonable”).  See also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) (‘delays of less than a year (between indictment and trial) are as a general matter constitutionally adequate . . .’); accord Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).


The Revised ICJ and its rules impose upon the member states (including courts of a member state) an absolute prohibition against admitting a juvenile to bond when the home/demanding state enters a warrant into NCIC as a “not eligible for bond.”