All Advisory Opinions At-A-Glance

Any state may submit an informal written request to the Executive Director for assistance in interpreting the rules of this compact. The Executive Director may seek the assistance of legal counsel, the Executive Committee, or both, in interpreting the rules. The Executive Committee may authorize its standing committees to assist in interpreting the rules. Interpretations of the rules shall be issued in writing by the Executive Director or the Executive Committee and shall be circulated to all of the states.

Disclaimer: Advisory Opinions are written in accordance with how a Rule is currently drafted. They are not intended for speculation or to encompass all scenarios, but are a legal interpretation of a Rule(s).

 

4-2010
Rule(s):
ICJ Rules
Date Issued:
Requester:
State of Montana
At Issue:

Applicability and enforceability of the rules of the Interstate Compact for Juveniles with sovereign tribal nations and reservation lands. Whether the Interstate Compact for Juveniles and its duly authorized rules apply to juveniles residing in sovereign tribal nations and reservation lands.

Finding:

Based upon the referenced provisions of the U.S. Constitution and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, in the absence of the Consent of Congress for tribes to enter into agreement with the states as members of the Interstate Compact for Juveniles, no such authority exists under which the provisions of the compact or its rules can regulate transfers of juveniles to and from sovereign tribal nations or reservation lands.

1-2010
Rule(s):
5-101
Date Issued:
Date Revised:
Requester:
Pennsylvania
At Issue:

Receiving State's Ability to Sanction Juveniles Under ICJ Rule 5-101(1)

Finding:

Using these well accepted rules of statutory interpretation, it is clear that because the ICJ rules do not include a special definition of the terms “same standards . . . that prevail for its own juveniles. . .” the ordinary meaning of those terms leads to the inevitable conclusion that as the supervising State, Pennsylvania is thus permitted, under Rule 5-101(1), to impose ‘graduated sanctions’ upon any juvenile transferred under the compact if such standards are also applied to its own delinquent juveniles.
 

3-2009
Rule(s):
Article VII, Article XIII, Section B., and Article XI, Section C.
Date Issued:
Requester:
Idaho
At Issue:

Whether the failure or refusal of an Idaho county official to properly process the lawful transfer of supervision of a juvenile from Idaho to another state and the failure or refusal of the same Idaho county, in another case, to supervise a juvenile whose supervision was properly transferred to Idaho from another state constitutes a violation(s) of the ICJ which would result in potential liability of the County and/or State of Idaho.

Finding:

As in most states counties are specifically classified and recognized as political subdivisions of the State of Idaho.See for example Bonneville County v. Ysursa, 129 P.3d 1213 (Id. 2005); also Sanchez v. State Department of Corrections141 P.3d 1108 (Id. 2006) which unequivocally recognize that a county is a political subdivision of the State. As a consequence the above ICJ provisions and authority apply equally and coextensively to all Idaho counties as political subdivisions. Thus, the failure of a county to comply with the provisions of the ICJ and its duly authorized rules is tantamount to a violation by the State of Idaho and a default in its obligations under the compact and authorized rules.

2-2009
Rule(s):
Article III, Section C. & Section G.
Date Issued:
Requester:
ICJ
At Issue:

Whether Ex-Officio members of the Interstate Commission for Juveniles or its' committees may make motions or cast votes?

Whether 'designees' or 'proxies' who are temporarily substituting for a commissioner at a meeting of the Commission or its' committees may make motions or cast votes?

Finding:

Regarding the first issue, a review of Art. III, Sec. C. of the compact statute indicates the clear intent to provide for participation in Commission meetings by 'non-commissioners' but to limit such participation by classifying those persons as "ex-officio (non-voting)" members. Based on this provision of Art. III, Sec. C of the ICJ, while participation in Commission meetings including providing comments and opinions during debate are permitted, that ex-officio members of the commission are neither eligible to vote nor make motions at Commission meetings. With respect to the second issue, it is clear that as long as the 'substitute' or 'proxy' has been appointed by the commissioner in consultation with the state council as required by section Art. III, Section G., by definition such person has the authority to both make motions and to vote at ICJ Commission meetings.

1-2009
Rule(s):
Article III, Section B. & Section G
Date Issued:
Requester:
ICJ
At Issue:

What qualifications are required by the Interstate Compact for Juveniles in order for a commissioner or designee to be eligible to represent and vote on behalf of each member state on the Interstate Commission for Juveniles?

What qualifications are required by the Interstate Compact for Juveniles for another authorized representative of a compact state if a commissioner has decided that it is necessary to delegate the authority to vote and to otherwise exercise the authority of the commissioner from that state for a specified meeting?

Finding:

The determination of whether an appointment of a commissioner is bona fide under the above referenced provisions of the Interstate Compact will depend upon establishing whether adequate documentation has been furnished to establish the 'appropriate appointing authority' has acted with respect to the appointment of the commissioner for that state. This can be demonstrated by such items as a gubernatorial executive order or letter of appointment, a statutory provision which clearly delegates such authority to another state official and proof that the official to who receives such delegated power has in fact issued an appointment letter to the proponent seeking recognition as a commissioner.

The above described procedure for the general appointment of a commissioner to act on behalf of a compact state under Article III, Section B. is a distinctly different process than the process which the compact provides in Article III, Section G. for the temporary appointment of another authorized representative to represent and vote on behalf of a state at a specific ICJ meeting in the absence of the commissioner. This temporary appointment for a specific meeting does not require the action by the 'appropriate appointing authority' and under the compact may be accomplished by action of the commissioner in consultation with the state council.