Advisory Opinion 4-2014

The West Region subgroup is understandably concerned about the potential for endangering the safety of a victim if a juvenile delinquent is transferred from a sending state to a receiving state when no custodial parent or legal guardian resides in the sending state, but such a parent or guardian does reside in the receiving state.  Admittedly, there could be situations in which a supervision transfer violates existing ‘no contact’ orders or other legal requirements involving a previous victim, such as a sibling or other family member.  However, ICJ Rule 4-104(5) also recognizes the rights of a legal guardian, which must be considered in the determination of whether or not a proposed transfer of supervision is suitable or legally authorized.

The question posed directly addresses a possible dichotomy created by the language of the existing provisions of ICJ Rule 4-104.  Can a receiving state legitimately accept supervision when the intended residence violates a ‘no contact order’ or other court ordered conditions of supervision?  Clearly, neither the provisions of the ICJ, nor the ICJ Rules contemplate, or should be interpreted to allow such a result.

Article I of the ICJ provides in Sections A and B that:

It is the purpose of this compact, through means of joint and cooperative action among the compacting states to:

1. ensure that the adjudicated juveniles and status offenders subject to this compact are provided adequate supervision and services in the receiving state as ordered by the adjudicating judge or parole authority in the sending state; and

2. ensure that the public safety interests of the citizens, including the victims of juvenile offenders, in both the sending and receiving states are adequately protected...

Moreover, ICJ Rule 1-101 clearly defines “Supervision” to mean the oversight exercised by the authorities of the sending and receiving states, during which time the juvenile is required to report or be monitored by appropriate authorities and to comply with regulations and conditions as determined by a court or appropriate authority (emphasis supplied).

Based upon the plain meaning of both the above referenced provisions of the ICJ and the ICJ Rules, it is clear that a receiving state is not authorized to violate court ordered conditions of supervision.  Article I (A) of the Compact expressly requires that compact officials “ensure that the adjudicated juveniles and status offenders subject to this compact are provided adequate supervision . . . in the receiving state as ordered by the adjudicating judge or parole authority in the sending state” (emphasis supplied).  As the Supreme Court has explained concerning the proper approach to interpretation of statutes or related regulations, “Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning . . . [O]ur inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

It is equally clear that under Article I (B) of the Compact, officials in Compact Member States are also unequivocally required to “adequately protect” the public safety interests of the citizens, “including the victims of juvenile offenders.” (emphasis supplied).  It is axiomatic that administrative rules, such as the above ICJ Rule, promulgated by an administrative agency, such as the Interstate Commission for Juveniles, cannot exceed the delegated authority granted to it by the statute.  See Federal Power Commission v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 394 (1974) (“It, [the applicable statute], does not authorize the Commission to set at naught an explicit provision of the Act.”) Id. at p. 394.